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abstract. Locke and Leibniz deny that there are any such beings
as ‘monsters’ (anomalies, natural curiosities, wonders, and marvels),
for two very different reasons. For Locke, monsters are not ‘natural
kinds’: the word ‘monster’ does not individuate any specific class of
beings ‘out there’ in the natural world. Monsters depend on our sub-
jective viewpoint. For Leibniz, there are no monsters because we are
all parts of the Great Chain of Being. Everything that happens, hap-
pens for a reason, including a monstrous birth. But what about mate-
rialism? Well, beginning with the anatomical interest into ‘monstrous
births’ in the French Acade´mie des Sciences in the first three decades
of the eighteenth century, there is a shift away from ‘imaginationist’
claims such as those of Malebranche, that if a woman gives birth
to a monstrous child it is a consequence of something she imagined.
Anatomists such as Lemery and Winslow try to formulate a strictly
mechanical explanation for such events, rejecting moral and meta-
physical explanations. Picking up on this work, materialist thinkers
like Diderot are compelled to reject the very idea of monsters. We
are all material beings produced according to the same mechanisms
or laws, some of us are more ‘successful’ products than others, i.e.
some live longer than others. In his late E´le´ments de physiologie he
says “L’homme est un effet commun, le monstre un effet rare.” Ulti-
mately he arrives at a materialist version of Leibniz’s position: there
are no monsters, we are all monsters in each other’s eyes, at one time
or another. This conclusion is a pregnant one in light of twentieth
century interest in the problem of ‘the normal and the pathological’
(Canguilhem), and the broader question of how materialism relates
to the biological world.
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Tout ce qui est ne peut eˆtre ni contre nature ni hors de nature.
Diderot.1
. . . ces noces contre nature qui sont la vraie Nature.
Deleuze & Guattari.2
The early modern era or aˆge classique may have been a demystifying or
‘naturalizing’ era, but it was nonetheless fascinated with monsters. The sit-
uation only becomes more extreme as one moves into the eighteenth century
and gets to Diderot, whose entire philosophy of nature is a philosophy of
monsters – whose entire universe, indeed, is permeated by monsters. The
Renaissance fascination gets ‘naturalized’ without lessening in its intensity:
entries like “Centaures” or “Faune” in the Encyclope´die reduce fauns to
the status of “wild men.”3 It is only once we reach texts like Albrecht
von Haller’s “Jeux de la Nature et Monstres” and La Fosse’s “Monstres.
Me´decine Le´gale” (both in the Supple´ment a` l’Encyclope´die, dated 1777),
that the frenzy of inquiry into ‘what is a monster?’ seems to have sub-
sided: more sober-minded questions are now being asked, such as ‘should
the monster be able to inherit from his or her parents?’ Of course, the ‘legal’
problem was not ‘discovered’ or ‘invented’ in the late eighteenth century, it
did not appear out of thin air: baptism had long been a problem, as we can
see in this blunt statement from Guido of Mont Rocher’s Manipulus Cu-
ratorum Officia Sacerdotus of 1480: “but what if there is a single monster
which has two bodies joined together: ought it to be baptized as one person
or two?”4 Obviously, the question hinges on whether the monster has one
or two souls. The connection between baptism and legal rights is explicitly
invoked by La Fosse in his article, which is concerned with “medical ju-
risprudence” (p. 956a). The Church is willing to baptize certain beings and
not others; those who are baptized must thus be entitled to the privileges
of the citizen (the full protection of the law, respect of testaments, etc.). It
turns out that the criterion of rationality – by which the monster can be
1Reˆve de D’Alembert (D’Alembert’s Dream), in Diderot, Œuvres, vol. 1: Philosophie,
ed. L. Versini (Paris: Laffont, coll. “Bouquins,” 1994), p. 673. Unless otherwise indicated
all works by Diderot will be quoted in this edition, indicated as V followed by page
number.
2Gilles Deleuze & Fe´lix Guattari, Mille plateaux (Paris: Minuit, 1980), p. 295.
3As noted by Patrick Graille, “Portrait scientifique et litte´raire de l’hybride au sie`cle
des Lumie`res,” in A. Curran, R.P. Maccubbin & D.F. Morrill, eds., Faces of Monstrosity
in Eighteenth-Century Thought, Eighteenth Century Life 21:2, special issue (May 1997),
pp. 75, 85 n. 26.
4Cit. in J. Block Friedman, The Monstrous Races in Medieval Art and Thought (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 182, and in Arnold Davidson, “The
Horror of Monsters,” in J.J. Sheehan & M. Sosna, eds., The Boundaries of Humanity.
Humans, Animals, Machines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 48.
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certified to be an animal rationale – is the presence of the head. La Fosse
thinks this is sufficient, since the seat of the soul should be in the head,
and rejects the more severe criterion according to which a malformed body
cannot house a soul.
Locke had already commented ironically on these unsettled debates con-
cerning the definition of ‘man’: some say animal rationale, but then, con-
sider the debates on whether or not to baptize an infant based on its form
(“outward configuration”5), along with the case of the Abbot known as the
“Abbe´ Malotru” because of his odd shape (ibid.). Locke’s own definition
is ‘formal’ in the sense of being non-substantialist: if the being can speak,
it has rights.6 La Fosse in 1777 is already quite comfortable with cultural
relativism, declaring that we cannot really judge what a monster is, since
we already differ from each other so widely, “from the Laplander to the
Eskimo” (p. 956b), but also internally, as “the constitution of our members
and our organs varies widely.” He concludes that God’s will should not be
invoked in an ongoing scientific inquiry.
1
I would like to call attention to a peculiar feature of the materialist approach
to monsters in this period, which I term the ‘denial’ of monsters. It amounts
to a paradoxical drive towards self-extinction: the materialist philosopher
is fascinated with monsters but ends up like the ‘professional atheist’ or the
full-time debunker of the existence of UFOs,7 devoting her life to the denial
of an ‘object’ that does not exist.8
In the earlier understanding of the monster as prodigium (‘wonder’, ‘mar-
vel’, or literally ‘prodigy’), the monstrous birth was an ‘omen’ or ‘portent’,
like a comet: a theologically or morally grounded sign of something to come
– a coming misfortune, to be precise.9 It has this symbolic status because
it is contra naturam. Given this status as a being ‘contrary to nature’, the
5John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. Nidditch (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1975), III.vi.26, hereafter quoted directly by book, chapter and
section number.
6Ibid., III.xi.16; cf. Leibniz, Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain (Paris:
Garnier-Flammarion, 1990), II.xxvii.9, p. 182 (on the speaking parrot), which Diderot
will later summarize as “Speak and I shall baptize you!”
7I thank Bret J. Doyle for this example.
8Admittedly, not all early modern materialists were concerned with monsters; con-
versely, various non-materialist philosophers, such as Aristotle or Augustine, were con-
cerned with them. What might be said is that anyone worried about the status of laws
of nature – as manifest in the biological realm, in this case – would surely be interested
in monsters; and most materialists felt strongly about Nature and its laws.
9Ambroise Pare´ declares this at the very beginning of Des monstres et des prodiges
(1573; ed. J. Ce´ard [Geneva: Droz, 1971], p. 3).
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conceptual trajectory of the monster then branches out into two distinct
directions, of which the first will be our primary concern: (i) the biological
or physical monster as a challenge for philosophy of nature proper, and (ii)
the ‘moral monster’, as found for instance in the writings of the Marquis
de Sade, but already depicted by Diderot with the character of Rameau’s
Nephew – although of course the Nephew is precisely determined by his
“cursed paternal molecules,”10 that is, by natural causes, since from a ma-
terialist standpoint, there are no moral monsters: they are either to be
naturalized and thus ‘denied’, or to be justified: “these creatures are nei-
ther good, nor beautiful, nor precious, nor created: they are the surface
foam, the result of nature’s blind laws.”11 Curiously, even once the mon-
ster is ‘naturalized’ so that it is no longer contra naturam, it remains the
source of a certain kind of reference. If we reflect on the old French proverb
which relies on Latin roots, “le monstre est ce qui montre” (“the monster
‘monstrates’,” as in ‘demonstrates’, from monstrare, to show12), we can see
that the initial sense of the expression is ‘to point out or at something hor-
rific’, as in the tragic case of the Elephant Man.13 And indeed in medieval
French the parade of freaks as an attraction at fairs was called “la montre.”
But then the situation becomes reversed, and, to borrow Annie Ibrahim’s
phrase, it is the monster which shows us something about the order of Na-
ture. In his preface to the Histoire de l’Acade´mie des Sciences, in which
the ‘research results’ of the Acade´mie were presented, several decades at a
time, Fontenelle discusses the large number of reports (me´moires) on mon-
10“Mon sang est le meˆme que celui de mon pe`re. La mole´cule paternelle e´tait dure
et obtuse; et cette maudite mole´cule premie`re s’est assimile´ tout le reste” (Le neveu
de Rameau, in Œuvres comple`tes, eds. H. Dieckmann, J. Proust & J. Varloot [Paris:
Hermann, 1975-], vol. 12, p. 172 – hereafter DPV followed by volume and page number).
11D.A.F. de Sade, Histoire de Juliette, in Œuvres comple`tes (Paris: Pauvert, 1967),
vol. 9, pp. 170-171.
12The Latin verb monstrare, to show, derives from the noun monstrum (divine portent,
prodigy, i.e. something deemed a pre-monition – whence our word ‘monster’ as well as
monitor, admonish, monument, premonition, summon, mind, mania, etc.), which derives
from the Latin verb monere (to remind, warn, advise), itself deriving from the Indo-
European root ‘men’ (to think, with derivatives referring to various qualities and states
of mind and thought). Hence the idea of the monster as an omen portending the will of the
gods, an extraordinary event that served as a divine ‘premonition’, a supernatural being
or object (Professor Stephen Esposito of the Classics Department at Boston University
kindly provided this information). For further details on the semantic history of ‘monster’
I refer to Beate Ochsner’s essay in this volume.
13In such cases physical monstrosity is taken to be indicative of moral monstrosity,
as in the case of Richard III (versus, say, Quasimodo, whose physical appearance is
the opposite of his moral goodness); a more complex case is Thomas Middleton’s play
“The Changeling” (1622), in which the hunchback Deflores is not innately evil, but is
instrumentalized by others to commit evil deeds, thanks to his outward appearance,
ultimately turning him into an evil person (I thank Roger Savage for this reference).
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sters that had been presented (notably on monstrous fetuses), and explains
that for the sake of understanding the structure of the human body, not
only animals but also monsters “must not be neglected,” for “the mecha-
nism that is hidden in one species or ordinary structure might develop in
another species, or extraordinary structure”; it seems as if Nature, which is
“constantly multiplying and varying its works,” “cannot help but betray its
secret, sometimes.”14 If the monster is there to show us something which
might otherwise remain hidden, then it must exist! This rather Cartesian
flourish is not enough, however, to produce a lasting effect; it would seem
as if the monster exists ‘for a while’, in order to reveal an underlying order
of Nature, but then vanishes, epochally speaking, after it has performed its
function. Jaucourt’s article “Prodige” in the Encyclope´die says that mon-
sters used to frighten people; now they are there “for the amusement of the
physicists” (the natural philosophers).
We might say that there are three types of ‘monstration’. Fortunio Liceti
undertook a first step of naturalization when he explained that it was wrong
to proceed etymologically and explain (type 1) that monsters were signs
from God – that in fact, their name comes from the fact that we point at
them, we “show” them (type 2). I would suggest a third type, represented
for instance by Francis Bacon’s idea that “deviations” such as monstrous
births are not an omen but rather an event which allows the naturalist to
glimpse existing natural structures:
Errors of nature . . . correct the erroneous impressions sug-
gested to the understanding by ordinary phenomena, and reveal
common forms. . . . For he that knows the ways of nature
will more easily observe her deviations; and on the other hand,
he that knows her deviations will more accurately describe her
ways.15
Bacon’s ‘naturalization’ culminates with Diderot, for whom monsters show
us Nature itself. In fact, Jaucourt’s comment itself still reflects a certain
unique existence of the monster, as found in cabinets of curiosities and
their scores of preserved, embalmed, or stuffed creatures; to be consistent,
naturalization should entail that monsters fully cease to be a source of
amusement.
Why should monsters continue to be interesting, then, if their ‘norma-
tive’ dimension has been ‘emptied out’, stripped away16 or de-essentialized?
14Histoire de l’Acade´mie des Sciences for 1699 (1718), Preface. See Anita Guerrini’s
essay in this volume for more discussion of passages like this one.
15Novum Organum, II, § 29, in The Works of Francis Bacon, ed. J. Spedding et al.,
vol. 4 (London: Longmans, 1870), p. 169.
16As Annie Ibrahim puts it in “The Status of Anomalies in the Philosophy of Diderot”
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First, because of the different kinds of reference which are at work. Mon-
strous births as ‘portents’ or ‘omens’ are direct causal reflections of mater-
nal imagination. They are signs the way smoke is a sign of fire. Monstrous
births as statistical anomalies,17 or in more Diderotian fashion, as rev-
elations of an essential monstrosity of Nature, are not signs in this way,
since there is no causal connection, no strong signification. But they are
not human-made signs either, like the word ‘fire’. However, my concern is
less with the status of monsters as signs,18 and more with the materialist
denial of any such status, which is closely related to the second reason that
monsters remain interesting ‘after’ or ‘within’ naturalization: because the
path of naturalization does not exactly produce a science of monsters.19 It
would be a curious science, after all, that demonstrated the non-existence
of its object. To be sure, the stirrings of what will become the science
of teratology in the nineteenth century can be detected in Re´aumur’s and
Maupertuis’ enthusiasm for ‘hybridizations’20, whether out of an interest in
what kind of embryological Bauplan best survives, or in the transmission
of genetic information. But, as Javier Moscoso points out in his detailed
study of the debates on monstrous fetuses in the Acade´mie des Sciences,
(this volume). This occurs in the Letter on the Blind, in which Diderot puts forth a
complex, biologically motivated critique of any universal metaphysics or ethics, using
the figure of the blind mathematician Saunderson to stress (a) the determination of
our metaphysics and ethics by the ‘state of our sense organs’, and by extension (b) the
ultimate relativity of all such judgments (V 147).
17It is only once such events are reduced to statistical anomalies that any ‘strong’
sense of monstrosity is ruled out, as in Darwin’s statement that “monstrosities cannot
be separated by any clear line of distinction from mere variations” (On the Origin of
Species, facsimile of the 1st edition [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966],
p. 8). Gilles Barroux suggests (personal communication) that it was the mathematician
Jean-Jacques Dortous de Mairan who introduced the statistical approach to monstrous
births (see the Histoire de l’Acade´mie des Sciences [1743]).
18This topic is addressed in Beate Ochsner’s essay in this volume.
19This marks a crucial difference between my perspective and that of Katharine Park
and Lorraine Daston’sWonders and the Order of Nature (New York: Zone Books, 1998),
which, in contrast to their earlier “Unnatural Conceptions: The Study of Monsters in
16th and 17th-Century France and England” (Past and Present 92 [1981]), asserts a form
of what Max Weber called the “polytheism of values,” since they reject any progressive
narrative of naturalization as being “teleological” (Wonders, p. 176). In their view,
the monster as omen and the monster as naturalized entity are ‘equal’, since scholarship
cannot make value judgments about the one at the expense of the other. Religion and
science are simply narratives. My concern is not to preserve the integrity of a preexisting
history of science, or narrative of a “progre`s de la conscience europe´nne” on a march
towards rationality, but to show that the process of naturalization is a crucial component
in building the fascinating paradox of monsters as a ‘disappearing object’ in Diderot’s
materialism.
20Rene´-Antoine Ferchault de Re´aumur, L’art de faire e´clore et d’e´lever en toute saison
des oiseaux domestiques de toutes espe`ces, 2 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1749);
Pierre-Moreau de Maupertuis, Ve´nus physique (1752; Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1980).
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if we consider the many hundreds of papers presented in the first half of
the eighteenth century to such institutions, a strict definition of ‘monster’,
whether intensional or extensional, is never given; thus there was never a
‘science of monsters’; even the teratology of the Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire fam-
ily in the nineteenth century was at most a science of ‘major and minor
deformities’.21
2
Our story, the materialist story, is not caught up in medieval or Renais-
sance debates on monsters; it can be said to begin with thinkers like Nicolas
Malebranche, who are willing to allow for ordinary causal explanations of
monstrous births, although the ultimate explanation lies in the ‘maternal
imagination’, through a communication between the mother’s brain and the
child’s brain. If the child bears a birthmark resembling, say, a pear, it is
because the mother coveted a pear; if the child resembles a lobster, it is be-
cause the mother coveted, and perhaps was frightened by a lobster.22 The
monster is a sign of maternal sin, and thus a sign of divine will itself.23
The ‘fault’ or ‘flaw’ lies in the mother’s appetites, but the mechanism of
transmission itself is not in question, since it is precisely the channel or in-
strument of God’s will, it allows God’s will to be done.24 The imaginationist
21Javier Moscoso, “Monsters as Evidence. The Uses of the Abnormal Body During
the Early Eighteenth Century,” Journal of the History of Biology 31:3 (1998). Annie
Ibrahim had made a similar point in her “Me´taphysique et anatomie au XVIIIe sie`cle (la
the´orie des monstres accidentels dans les Me´moires de Louis Le´mery a` l’Acade´mie des
sciences),” Recherches sur le XVII e sie`cle 8 (1986): no experimental solution was ever
proposed which might have concluded the querelle des monstres (which I shall discuss
below).
22Park and Daston, inWonders and the Order of Nature, p. 197, quote a description in
James Duplessis’ A Short History of Human Prodigious and Monstrous Births (c. 1680;
Sloane ms. 5246, British Museum), of a woman whose “Monstrous Birth was Caused
by her Loosing her Longing, for a very Large Lobster which she had seen in Leadenhall
Market for which she had been Asked an Exorbitant Price” (her husband later brought
the lobster home for her and she fainted).
23Park and Daston, in “Unnatural Conceptions: The Study of Monsters in 16th and
17th-Century France and England,” p. 25 & n. 13, refer to De Civitate Dei, XXI, 8, and
the development of the idea in Isidore of Seville, Etymologiae, XI, 3.
24Nicolas Malebranche, La Recherche de la Ve´rite´, II-1, iv and Traite´ de la nature
et de la graˆce, I, xviii, in Œuvres, ed. G. Rodis-Lewis, vols. 1, 2 (Paris: Gallimard-
Ple´iade, 1979) – actually an attack on Lucretianism. The argument moves from Descartes,
following a Biblical tradition (the tale of Jacob and his spotted sheep, Genesis 30: 31-
42), via Augustine (De Trinitate III, vii, §15); cf. Jacques Roger, Les sciences de la vie
dans la pense´e franc¸aise au XVIII e sie`cle (3d edition, Paris: Albin Michel, 1993), pp.
63-88. Leibniz, too, allows for maternal imagination as an explanation (Nouveaux essais,
III.vi.23, p. 246). The best response to the imaginationist position is Maupertuis’ in his
Ve´nus physique, pp. 116, 122f. (also found in Buffon’s Histoire des animaux and the
Encyclope´die article “Imagination – des femmes enceintes”): accusations based on marks
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thesis is indeed an attempt at a causal explanation, since it seeks to improve
on earlier claims about, e.g., women having intercourse with succubi,25 but
it tells us nothing about monsters themselves: it is precisely an account of
maternal imagination.
These questions of origin, crystallizing into causal explanations, give rise
to a great debate in the Paris Acade´mie des Sciences, in which anatomical
arguments are ultimately metaphysical arguments, or, differently put, in
which metaphysics is summoned to the dissection tables (in Annie Ibrahim’s
vivid formulation): should monstrous births be explained in terms of final
causes or accidental causes? The initial position was to reject accidents
in favor of the system of “originarily monstrous eggs” (“œufs originaire-
ment monstrueux”). The anatomist Jacques-Benignus Winslow explained
monstrous births by conditions already present in the egg, so that the mon-
strosity we experience is simply a sort of sketch which nature merely fills
in. His position is consonant with preformationism, even though his 1733
classification of monsters considerably added to available information by its
descriptions. The problem is, what about exceptions? Louis Le´mery (a
practicing physician at the Hoˆtel-Dieu who was elected to the Acade´mie,
first to a chair in botany and later in chemistry) seized on this weakness and
attacked the system of ‘originarily monstrous eggs’ in his Second me´moire
sur les monstres (1738), which instead invoked accidental causes such as
uterine shocks or deformations, as an explanation. His other target was
Joseph-Guichard Duverney’s providentialist view that when we dissect mon-
strous fetuses such as Siamese twins, we nevertheless find evidence of design,
that has simply been ‘inverted’ (cases of situs inversus) or ‘doubled’ (cases
of excessive organs and the like). The empiricist critique of preformationism
is also articulated in philosophy, by Locke: the fact that there are “frequent
productions of monsters, in all the species of Animals, and of Changelings”
(III.iii.18) means that Locke prefers an atomistic / corpuscular explanation
of the generation of forms, since it leaves room for accident, as opposed to
substantial forms and the like.
Albrecht von Haller discusses the querelle des monstres in his article
“Jeux de la Nature & Monstres.”26 According to Haller, there are two
systems dealing with the formation of monsters. The first and most ancient
is also the dominant one. It is the explanation appealing to accidental
causes, beginning with Democritus (the vision of ‘atoms-and-chance’ is the
perennial culprit for all finalist, anti-materialist thinkers), and continuing
borne by the infant reflect the imagination of the beholder.
25Georges Canguilhem, “La monstruosite´ et le monstrueux,” in La connaissance de la
vie (Paris: Vrin, 2nd revised edition, 1980), p. 175.
26In Supple´ment a` l’Encyclope´die, vol. III (Amsterdam: M.-M. Rey, 1777), pp. 551a-
558b.
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with Aristotle. In the contemporary context, Haller identifies this system
with Le´mery. The other system
allows for accidental causes in the formation of a great number
of monsters, but it recognizes others which appear to be ‘above’
the power of accidents; these can only stem from a primitive
structure, different from the ordinary structure. This system
does not go back earlier than M. Regis, but it has on its side Du
Verney, Me´ry, Winslow, M. de Mairan, M. de Haller.27
Both Le´mery and Duverney believe in the preexistence of germs, but Le´mery
does not want to hold God responsible for monstrous births: why would He
have produced useless beings?28 Thus he will explain ‘fusions’ (“soudures”)
such as Siamese twins, by the shock of two ‘germs’ or ‘seeds’ in the early
stages of embryogenesis. One of the clearest statements of this explanation
in terms of ‘shock’ comes from no less a figure than Shaftesbury:
Much less let us account it strange, if either by outward shock, or
by some interior wound from hostile matter, particular animals
are deformed even in their first conception, when the disease
invades the seats of generation, and seminal parts are injured
and obstructed in their accurate labors. ‘Tis then alone that
monstrous shapes are seen.29
For religious reasons Haller cannot accept the explanation by accidental
causes.30 So he rejects Le´mery’s appeal to chance and overall ‘accidental-
ism’; if there are indeed ‘games of Nature’, they are part of God’s will. He
does not want to decide what actually happens in the “apparent union of
two embryos.”31 If something like the jaw is poorly formed, he is happy to
allow for some degree of accident, but ultimately, “none of this could have
been the effect of chance” (ibid.), or, less firmly, “some circumstances do not
appear to be the effect of chance” (ibid., p. 557b). La Fosse, in his article
“Monstres. Me´decine Le´gale,” also summarizes the old quarrels, but con-
veys more of an ‘Enlightenment’ sensibility when he regrets that confusion
as to the causes of monstrous births may have led some unfortunate mothers
to being burned at the stake. In “Pyrrhonian” fashion (the article begins by
stating “If Pyrrhonianism were ever useful in a question of physics, it would
27Ibid., p. 556b.
28Me´moires de l’Acade´mie des Sciences (1740), pp. 269-272.
29The Moralists, in Characteristics (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), II, p. 23.
30On Haller’s unspoken convictions, see Jean-Louis Fischer, “L’Encyclope´die pre´sente-
t-elle une pre´-science des monstres ?”, Recherches sur Diderot et l’Encyclope´die 16 (avril
1994).
31Haller, “Jeux de la Nature et Monstres,” p. 557a.
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undoubtedly be that which treats the existence and origin of monsters”),
he prefers not to take sides, between primitively formed, “preexistent mon-
strous germs,” and the accidental explanation (shock). However, he allows
that the latter explanation seems to be closer to everyday experience (p.
955b).
Diderot will take up this quarrel, emphasize its metaphysical dimensions,
and of course accentuate the hazardous, accidental, random, chaotic dimen-
sion of the production of natural forms beyond anything the anatomists
ever intended.32 For the present purposes his ‘transformist’ vision, in which
monsters are one moment among many, of the productions of the universe
(some last longer than others, others are quickly “exterminated” by Na-
ture33) can be found equally in the Lettre sur les aveugles (1749), Le Reˆve
de D’Alembert (circa 1769), and the late, unfinished E´le´ments de physiologie
(1780s).34 Diderot returns the question to its fully ‘scandalous’ dimensions,
but appears to be caught in a dilemma, of simultaneously projecting the
figure of monstrosity onto the entire universe and denying that we have any
ability to legitimately call something ‘monstrous’: “If everything is in flux,
as we have hardly any reason to doubt, then all beings are monstrous, that
is, more or less incompatible with the subsequent order.”35
3
This denial of a certain kind of unique existence of monstrosity first emerges,
in two very different strategies, with Locke and Leibniz. Montaigne had
indeed declared in the essay “D’un enfant monstrueux” (Essais II, 30) that
monsters are nothing in the eyes of God,36 but his intention was primarily
to restrict the scope of our judgments about the world, without entering into
explicitly ‘realist’ debates on what there is in the universe. The philosophical
denial of monsters discussed here is intimately involved with a series of
other claims about Nature – its laws, species, kinds and essences – but also
humanity itself, considered from a materialist point of view. In order to go as
32On Diderot and monsters see Geoffrey N. Laidlaw, “Diderot’s Teratology,” Diderot
Studies 4 (1963); Emita Hill, “Materialism and Monsters in the Reˆve de D’Alembert”
and David Funt, “On the Conception of the Vicieux in Diderot,” both in Diderot Studies
10 (1968); the work of Annie Ibrahim, including her essay in this volume; most recently,
Andrew Curran, Sublime Disorder: Physical Monstrosity in Diderot’s Universe (Oxford:
Voltaire Foundation, 2001).
33Diderot, E´le´ments de physiologie, V 1276.
34I have discussed the question of Diderot’s transformism (or ‘proto-evolutionism’) in
“La querelle du transformisme,” presentation to the Groupe de recherches sur le Reˆve
de D’Alembert, E´cole Normale Supe´rieure, Fontenay Saint-Cloud (April 2000), online at
www.cerphi.net/did/seance6.htm
35Observations on Hemsterhuis, V 768.
36See Tristan Dagron’s discussion of this text, in this volume.
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far as Diderot does, beyond the strictly anatomical questions of the querelle
des monstres, and also beyond the materialist and reductionist positions of
thinkers like La Mettrie or d’Holbach, for whom “There can be no monsters,
prodigies, marvels or miracles in Nature. What we call monsters are merely
combinations with which our eyes are not familiar,”37 he has to take Lockean
and Leibnizian elements and radicalize them. In order to make this clearer,
I shall briefly summarize the respective approaches of Locke and Leibniz
towards monsters.
For Locke ‘monster’ can only be a nominal essence, not a real essence.38
We have no way of knowing if the beings we call ‘monsters’ really are such.
To use the current term of art, monsters are not “natural kinds.” The prob-
lem comes out of that of species: again it is only a nominal essence, ‘our
way of dividing up the world’. A wolverine or a giant squid is a nominal
essence (we decided to individuate them rather than calling them ‘animals
that live in or near Australia’). Essences are “the workmanship of the
understanding” (III.iii.14). They are abstract ideas which rely on the sub-
jective constitution of complexes of ideas (complex ideas). Thus even our
own species, which is most familiar to us, still comprises areas of debate, e.g.
whether “the foetus born of a woman were a man” (ibid.). The “frequent
productions of monsters” (ibid., § 18) imply two things for Locke: (i) that
we should not speak so confidently about essences (whether monstrous or
human), and (ii) that if there are essences, Nature might not successfully
‘reach’ the essence it ‘intends’ (“designs”) in the “production of things”
(ibid., § 16). Essentialism holds Nature to a standard it cannot live up to.
The frequency of ‘accidents’ in development reinforces Locke’s preference
for the corpuscularian hypothesis – which for present purposes is a modern
form of atomism, fully compatible with chance (ibid., § 18).
Monsters are not ‘species’; if this seems like unnecessary caution, recall
that Locke is reacting against the classificatory fervor of the centuries before
him, which sought to distinguish ‘good’ or ‘marvelous’ monsters from ‘bad’
or ‘ominous’ ones. They are not, since they lack a unique “constitution”
(III.vi.17): the viscerae, the skeleton, the organs are there, in a different
arrangement. Monstrous births, “Changelings,” “Drills,” beings which are
shaped like us but are hairy and “want speech”; beings – the existence of
which is only rumoured – which are hairy, have speech . . . and a hairy tail,
are all Men – or not – only by virtue of our nominal decisions, that is, by
the “workmanship of our understanding.” Hairiness or rather the absence
37Paul-Henri Thiry, Baron d’Holbach, Syste`me de la nature, ed. J. Boulad-Ayoub
(1781; reprint, Paris: Fayard, 1990), Book I, ch. vi.
38Essay, III.iii.15-19. Real essences could be defined as: (a) things that necessarily are
implied in our nominal essences; (b) what we actually have sensations of; things with
powers in them to cause our sensations.
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thereof does not make the man.39 There would be no debate about whether
a fetus is human or monstrous if these terms were real essences, but they
are merely nominal. “Wherein . . . consists the precise and unmovable
boundaries of . . . species? ‘Tis plain, if we examine, there is no such thing
made by Nature” (III.vi.27).40
For Leibniz, the principle of plenitude prevents us from speaking about
monsters, in the strict sense, since monsters, like us, occupy a ‘rung’ in
the great chain of being. All the beings that comprise the universe are,
in God’s mind, points on a simple curve.41 Nature leaves no vacuum, and
there necessarily are species which have never existed and never will, as they
are not compatible with the succession of creatures that God has chosen.42
Monsters, then, are ‘intermediate beings’ (“des beˆtes qui tiennent le milieu,”
“des cre´atures mitoyennes”43) which ensure the continuity of the chain of
beings. For example, the polyp is the being in between plants and insects.
Who knows where the monster fits? Leibniz asks the question of baptism,
too, and declares that theologians and all the other judges can only judge
based on form. But when the being is an ‘intermediate being’, ordinary
categories are suspended.
Our understanding of physical species is provisional, and proportionate
to our knowledge.44 As regards the variety of species which we experience,
that is, the plurality of forms, precisely the fact that there seems to be
an interplay between cats, lynx and the like (and moreover, a ‘return’ of
certain traits after many generations of cross-breeding) implies that there
might be an ‘essence of cat’ which recurs, without having to be present
in every generation (ibid.). Against Linnaeus, species do not reflect the
true order of Nature. Leibniz thus seizes on what one might call Locke’s
‘agnostic weakness’ and asks: how do we know that Nature does not have
real essences? “If we cannot judge internal resemblances by the external
conformation, do they thereby exist any less in nature?”45 Thinking back
to the chain of being, one sees that monstrosity (like evil or suffering) is
part of a broader ‘canvas’ which the human intellect cannot fully make out.
Contrary to Locke, and against Locke, Leibniz holds (i) that man is
indeed an animal rationale, (ii) that there are real essences, and (iii) that
39Linnaeus will reiterate this in his catalogue of the animals of Sweden, the Fauna
suecica (Leyden: C. & G.J. Wishoff, 1746).
40For more on Locke on species and related questions, see Justin E.H. Smith’s essay
“Degeneration and Hybridism in the Early Modern Species Debate,” in this volume.
41Leibniz, letter to Herman, in Appel au public par M. Koenig (Leyden: Luzac, 1752),
p. 44.
42Leibniz, Nouveaux essais, III.vi.12, p. 239.
43Ibid., pp. 238, 239.
44Ibid., § 23, p. 247.
45Ibid., III.iii.14, p. 227.
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we can know them. The fact that some men are not rational does not refute
(i), but is merely evidence of some material obstruction (“empeˆchement”46);
precisely, children “who are somehow monstrous” (“qui ont quelque chose
de monstrueux”) sometimes reach an age where they visibly are rational.
Rationality is an essential attribute of man; hairiness or possessing a tail is
not.47 In sum, the existence of real essences and our ability to know them
does not entail any validation of the category of ‘monster’.
4
Diderot takes the Lockean point that species are merely nominal essences,
and moves it one step further: (1) species are fictions, (2) boundaries be-
tween mineral, vegetable and animal kingdoms are also fictions (D’Alembert’s
Dream proposes in its first pages a thought-experiment involving a marble
statue coming to life by progressive “animalisation” of its matter). Species
are not essences, but rather temporally bound “tendencies towards a com-
mon end which is proper to them,”48 comprised of whatever happens in
between a terminus a quo and a terminus ad quem, a series of generations.
“The monster is born and dies; the individual is exterminated in less than a
hundred years. Why shouldn’t nature exterminate the species, over a longer
course of time?”49 This is no longer a ‘methodological’ caution about how
we cannot know if some being – slightly crustacean-like, or perhaps very
hairy, or with an excrescence on its forehead resembling a monk’s cowl – is
a monster or a human. It is an assertion of monstrosity, with a strongly
amoral consequence: there is no perfectibility of the universe, there is no
progress; there is only a Lucretian chaos of beings produced randomly. As
the blind mathematician Saunderson declares, sketching out a brief cos-
mogony in the Letter on the Blind,
In the beginning, when matter in fermentation gave birth to the
universe, my kin [sc. monsters – C.W.] were quite common.
But why not apply to worlds themselves, what I believe about
animals? How many crippled, failed worlds have disintegrated,
reintegrated and are perhaps dissipating again at each moment,
in distant spaces that I cannot touch, and where you cannot see,
but where motion continues and will continue to combine heaps
of matter, until they reach an arrangement in which they can
persevere? (V 169)
46Ibid., III.vi.14, p. 241.
47Ibid., § 22, pp. 243, 244.
48Diderot, D’Alembert’s Dream, V 637.
49Elements of Physiology, V 1276.
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Order, or rather, the natural regularities which we experience and by means
of which we assert the existence of laws of nature, is in fact only the “limits
of our understanding,” faced with the “infinite multitude of the phenomena
of Nature.”50 This is Diderot’s Lucretian re-reading of Leibniz’s principle
of plenitude and the chain of being: “the chain of being is not interrupted
by the variety of forms,” so that “There is nothing imperfect in nature, not
even monsters. Everything is linked together (tout y est enchaˆıne´) and the
monster is as necessary an effect therein, as the most perfect animal.”51
The chain of being becomes a conceptual basis for asserting the material
unity of all natural beings; in other words, it is open to a monistic in-
terpretation,52 just as the monad, in Diderot’s article “Leibnizianisme,” is
reinterpreted with reference to Hobbes as a living, sensing unit of matter.53
The ‘chaosmos’ of D’Alembert’s Dream extends this rather structural and
epistemological vision into an atomistic cosmogony (the book was originally
entitled Democritus’ Dream!), in which monsters play a key role. Not only
is organic and material unity asserted, via the chain of being, but the di-
mension of the unknown is added. There is no guarantee that all anomalies
have already occurred, so unknown forms can appear at any time. Nature
in fact eliminates nothing, it “brings all that is possible, with time,” or more
strongly, “Time is nothing for Nature.”54 There is a sense here which harks
back to Empedocles and Lucretius,55 of the Earth gradually exhausting its
50Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature, § 6, V 562.
51Elements of Physiology, V 1261; article “Imparfait,” in Encyclope´die de Diderot
et d’Alembert, 35 vols. (1751-1780; reprint, Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-
Holzboog, 1966), vol. 8, p. 584a.
52On a historical note, this is why Malesherbes, before he became an honorary member
of the Acade´mie des sciences in 1750, planned to publish a reaction to the first volumes
of Buffon’s Histoire naturelle (which prominently featured the chain of being), warning
Buffon against the notion: the more one emphasized the minute nuances separating
each species, the more one facilitated leaps, shifts, transformations, and ultimately the
disappearance of boundaries between species. See Chre´tien-Guillaume de Malesherbes,
Observations sur l’Histoire naturelle . . . de Buffon et Daubenton (Paris: Pougens, an
VII [1798]), pp. 5-37, as quoted by Roger, Les sciences de la vie, pp. 687-688. (Voltaire,
too, was opposed to the continuity of organic beings for this reason.)
53Or rather, as “l’atome re´el de la nature” (DPV, vol. 7, p. 692).
54Diderot, D’Alembert’s Dream, V 651, 615; cf. his 1761 text on the calculus of proba-
bilities, in which he declares “Avec le temps, tout ce qui est possible dans la nature, est”
(Sur deux me´moires de D’Alembert, § 1, observation, DPV, vol. 2, p. 351), itself recall-
ing Buffon’s “Tout ce qui peut eˆtre, est” (Histoire naturelle, “Discours sur la manie`re
d’e´tudier et de traiter l’histoire naturelle”).
55And also to a contemporary of Diderot’s who was initially unknown to him, the
French consul in Cairo, Benoˆıt de Maillet, author of an odd work entitled Telliamed
ou de la diminution de la mer (1748; trans. A. Carozzi, Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1968) – a phantasmagoric vision of fish being accidentally stranded on the earth,
and learning how to fly over a series of random attempts lasting one million years. The
story is often mentioned as an ‘anticipation’ of evolutionary thought; however, Maillet
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fertility, so that the ‘normalcy’ and stability of species we experience now
is simply the result of this diminishment: in its younger years, the Earth
produced new – and thus ‘monstrous’ – beings all the time).
This is why Diderot cannot be a ‘Darwinian’: not only is there no sta-
bility of species, but an additional, metaphysical claim is being made about
monsters, as synonymous with the ‘innovative’, ‘transformative’ power of
Nature, which is beyond the reach of the human intellect56 – a vision to-
tally at odds with an Aristotelian world in which monsters are just the
occasional ‘misfirings’ of a fully ordered Nature.57 Indeed, monsters are
everywhere: “maybe man is simply the monster of woman, or woman the
monster of man” (initially an observation about the symmetry of organs
such as the testicles and the ovaries, but extended into a metaphysical
posit by Diderot); in the Letter on the Blind, Saunderson delicately but
firmly reminds the cleric Holmes, who is at his deathbed, that he is one
of the “monstrous productions” that still occasionally appear; D’Alembert’s
Dream ends with a query by Mlle de Lespinasse on the origin of “that abom-
inable taste,” by which she means homosexuality. Overall, “man is merely
a common effect, and the monster a rare effect; both are equally necessary
and equally natural.”58
The monster is used to relativize normalcy, but then there is no monster
as such – so there can be no normalcy either. How could there be norms,
if our morals are dependent on the state or configuration of our organs? In
fact, there are still “more or less vigorous natures,” or “constitutions,” in a
typology of characters according to their degree of organic sensitivity. This
allows Diderot to maintain a thoroughgoing materialism while at the same
does not formulate any idea of species-transformation, because he holds that all species
already existed in the sea, and simply generated analogs on earth.
56Is the monster something new in relation to norms of organic life? The norm would
then be static and unchangeable. Actually, following Canguilhem’s suggestion ( “La mon-
struosite´ et le monstrueux,” p. 172), the norm – the species that endures – is only an
ephemeral and transitory regularity, a temporary barrier against processes of decompo-
sition and transformation. One might say that only that which is ‘teleologically correct’,
‘on track’ can claim to be the actualization of the new. This is roughly Maupertuis’
vision of species, and of normalcy: for any novelty ever to occur, a certain ‘undercurrent’
of monstrosity must be at work; from normalcy alone, no new species could emerge. See
his Dissertation philosophique a` l’occasion du ne`gre blanc (1744).
57Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals, IV.4, 770b9 and IV.3, 767b. In his essay
“Monstrosita¨ten in gelehrten Rau¨men” (in P. Lutz, T. Macho et al., eds., Der [im-
]perfekte Mensch [Cologne/Weimar: Bo¨hlau Verlag, 2003]), Michael Hagner presents
Pliny as having a similarly anti-Aristotelian and ‘productivist’ vision of Nature.
58Respectively, D’Alembert’s Dream, V 645; Letter on the Blind, V 168; D’Alembert’s
Dream, V 676, 636. Diderot (through the character of Dr Bordeu) answers Mlle de
Lespinasse with a cultural explanation (for ancient Greece) and a natural explanation
(the fear of venereal disease in contemporary Paris), effectively deflating once again any
normative or substantive definition.
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time recognizing the existence of statistically ‘abnormal’ human types such
as “the artist” or “the genius,” whose nervous system is literally intensified,
more ‘powerful’ or composed of more numerous interconnexions than ours.59
The idea of ‘vigorous constitutions’ is Diderot’s concession to ‘basement-
level’ explanations: everything reduces to faisceaux, and “the varieties of
the faisceau in a species produce all possible monstrous varieties within
that species.”60 Hence types such as the genius are nothing other than
monsters: “it is in the eternal order of things that the monster known as
‘the genius’ is always infinitely rare.”61
If, instead of fixed, stable forms with their corresponding norms and value
judgments, there is only a universe in constant transformation – such that
any species can turn out to be a ‘monster’ in the sense of a non-viable form
with a limited life-span – and more or less ‘vigorous’ or ‘sensitive’ constitu-
tions in the midst of these transformations, then normality and abnormality
have indeed been reduced to merely statistical regularities or anomalies. The
Leibnizian side of Diderot’s argument lies in his frequent invocation of the
infinite number of possible organic “developments.” The Lockean side of
his argument would be that our belief in our ‘names of substances’ implies
a belief in the regularity of Nature which is itself unquestioned. Materi-
alism as expressed here is somehow the fusion of these two (traditionally
irreconcilable) lines of argument, augmented with a probabilistic, atomistic
emphasis on the ale´atoire.62 It does not rest on the belief that Nature is
fundamentally ordered and lawlike, or that we could ever know any such
laws, if they existed. This is why Diderot emphasizes in his late writings
on physiology that we only know the “forms” of things, which are merely
“masks.”63
5
If monstrosity has become a feature of Nature itself, then those who are ac-
customed to finding ‘law and order’ when they look at Nature will find, like
the surgeon Georges Arnaud de Ronsil reacting to the case of hermaphrodites,
that “ce n’est qu’a` peine que l’on reconnaˆıt la nature dans la nature meme.”64
59D’Alembert’s Dream, V 660.
60Ibid., V 645.
61Refutation of Helve´tius, V 788.
62On the theme of a ‘random’ or ‘probabilistic’ materialism, as presented in contem-
porary philosophy by Althusser in his late writings, see Jean-Claude Bourdin, “The Un-
certain Materialism of Louis Althusser,” in C. Wolfe, ed., The Renewal of Materialism
(Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 22:1, special issue [2000]).
63Elements of Physiology, V 1317, 1261.
64Les Hermaphrodites, me´moires de Chirurgie (London: Nourse / Paris: Dessain,
1768), p. 246, cit. in Andrew Curran & Patrick Graille’s introduction to Curran et al.,
eds., Faces of Monstrosity, p. 8.
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The nominalist, Lockean side of Diderot’s approach to monsters leads
him to go beyond the ‘secularization’ of their theological function as signs –
as in Bacon and Fontenelle, for whom monsters, considered as exceptions or
deviations, point to the order of Nature itself – and reject the idea of laws
of nature itself. However, where Locke’s position remained strictly method-
ological, without any ‘ontologically realist’ claims about the existence or
non-existence of monsters, Diderot’s Leibnizian, ‘metaphysical’ side, which
is reinforced (or fueled) by biological speculation on generation overall, leads
him to make such ‘realist’ claims; this also distinguishes him from the posi-
tion of outright materialist denial of monsters in a deflationary sense, as for
instance in d’Holbach. The further step Diderot takes is to empty out the
concept of monster of any normative content. He does this both in the ‘Lu-
cretian’ gesture we have seen in the Letter on the Blind and D’Alembert’s
Dream, in which empiricism and sensationism are extended into a kind of
cosmogony, and, in the third and final dialogue of the latter work, by con-
structing a thought-experiment involving the production of monsters.
In the year of the French Revolution, the prolific commercial pornogra-
pher Re´tif de la Bretonne published a novel entitled Dom Bougre aux Etats
Ge´ne´raux, which contains an extraordinary line that sums up the idea of
teratological production, from chicken embryos in the nineteenth century
to clones today. A farm boy has been caught committing a bestial act
with a cow, and he responds angrily: “eh mais, je faisons un monstre pour
la foire Saint-Germain”!65 Re´tif’s phrase is striking inasmuch it totally
abandons any concern with an ‘identity’ of monsters and asserts their arti-
ficiality, equating them with hybrids, i.e. ‘controlled monsters’. Similarly,
in the last dialogue of D’Alembert’s Dream, Diderot himself moves from
Nature’s capacity to produce monsters to our own capacity to do so: Mlle
de Lespinasse imagines the production of a race of che`vre-pieds, faun-like
men with goat’s hooves, who could serve as the ideal ‘footmen’ and thereby
release the lower classes from indentured servitude; Dr Bordeu responds,
“je ne vous les garantis pas bien moraux” (V 675): no normativity indeed!
This should lead us to ask: if there is no such thing as monsters, what is
it that the teratologists – whether Re´aumur, the Geoffroy Saint-Hilaires, or
Camille Dareste in the later nineteenth century – are producing?
The paradox inherent in the ‘materialist denial of monsters’ has less to
do, I suggest, with a ‘primacy of the abnormal over the norm’, than with
a constitutive tension in materialist thought: if materialism is understood
as a ‘physicalism’, the features of the organic disappear in a fully rational
65In Œuvres e´rotiques de Re´tif de la Bretonne (Paris: Fayard, 1985), p. 554, quoted
by P. Graille, op. cit., p. 87, n. 41. The Foire Saint-Germain still exists today but, like
Coney Island, has eliminated the ‘freak show’ component of its exhibitions.
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and/or mechanical world, in which monsters could at best be defined in
terms of probabilities; if it remains organic (in Diderot’s sense, filled with
sensibilite´, faisceaux and the like), the materialist philosopher can retain
a “beautiful Nature,” in which artists and geniuses continue to exist. Put
differently, if there is no such thing as a monstrous machine, to use Can-
guilhem’s image,66 then it would appear that monsters are so important to
early modern materialism because they reveal something about the biological
world.67
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